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Abstract
In his effort to provide sociology with a theory of behavior for the microfoundation of 
social phenomena, Raymond Boudon searched for a theory that could be presented as 
general (i.e., a theory that, given its strength, can be used “by default” in explanations). 
In this search, Boudon disregarded biological causes and stated that his Theory of Ordi-
nary Rationality was the best choice, since it offers final explanations: when a behavior 
is explained as a result of beliefs that are grounded on good reasons, we are offering a 
black-box-free explanation. In this paper, I shall state that there are serious problems in 
the arguments that Boudon used to dismiss the explanatory strategy based on “biological 
causes”. Secondly, I shall point out that some recent findings of several behavioral sciences 
constitute a radical questioning of the value of his Theory of Ordinary Rationality, as well 
as a positive revaluation of Evolutionary Psychology. In light of these findings, we can state 
that on many occasions, either reasons are systematically biased by biological causes, or 
these causes cause behavior, thus reasons are mere rationalizations. Therefore, neither the 
reason-based explanatory strategy nor the biological causes-based explanatory strategy can 
be used “by default”. Given the current state of our knowledge, Evolutionary Psychology 
cannot stand as a general theory of behavior but is better placed to do the job in the future: 
it will depend on its ability to build models that integrate reasons and biological causes. 
Keywords: rationality; rationalism; reasons; evolutionary psychology; adapted mechanisms; 
biological causes; Raymond Boudon.
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Resumen. Razones y causas biológicas. Algunas reflexiones sobre la teoría de la racionalidad 
ordinaria de Boudon.
En su esfuerzo por proveer a la sociología de una teoría del comportamiento con la que 
microfundamentar los fenómenos sociales, Raymond Boudon buscó una teoría que pudiese 
presentarse como general (es decir, una teoría que, dada su fortaleza, pudiera usarse «por 
defecto» en las explicaciones). En esta búsqueda, Boudon desconsideró las causas biológicas 
y defendió que su teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria era la mejor elección, pues ofrecía 
explicaciones finales: cuando una conducta se explica como resultado de creencias que están 
bien fundamentadas en buenas razones, estamos ofreciendo una explicación libre de «cajas 
negras». En este artículo, sostendré que existen serios problemas en los argumentos que usó 
Boudon para descartar la estrategia explicativa basada en las causas biológicas. En segundo 
lugar, señalaré que algunos hallazgos recientes de varias ciencias del comportamiento supo-
nen un cuestionamiento radical del valor de su teoría de la racionalidad ordinaria así como 
una reevaluación positiva de la psicología evolucionista. A la luz de estos hallazgos, podemos 
sostener que, en muchas ocasiones, o bien las razones están sistemáticamente sesgadas por 
causas biológicas, o bien esas causas causan directamente la conducta, por lo que entonces 
las razones son meras racionalizaciones. Por lo tanto, ni la estrategia explicativa basada en 
razones ni la basada en causas biológicas pueden usarse «por defecto». Dado el estado actual 
de nuestro conocimiento, la psicología evolucionista no puede proponerse como una teoría 
general del comportamiento, pero está mejor situada para hacerlo en el futuro: dependerá 
de su habilidad para construir modelos que integren razones y causas biológicas. 
Palabras clave: racionalidad; razones; racionalismo; psicología evolucionista; mecanismos 
adaptativos; causas biológicas; Raymond Boudon.
1. Introduction
Almost a dozen decades after the publication of Durkheim’s Rules of Socio-
logical Method, most sociologists are still stuck in the foundational error of 
the discipline: the idea that social facts are sui generis and hence irreducible 
to lower-level facts. Armed with an argument that legitimates a frequently 
proud ignorance of the developments of the rest of the sciences, most soci-
ologists keep themselves outside of the project that places the hope for a 
renovation and a better future for the discipline in the microfoundation of 
social phenomena. Raymond Boudon has certainly been one of the excep-
tions in this gloomy picture, and his effort to provide sociology with a 
theory of behavior for the microfoundation of its explanations shined as 
few others did.
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With this project in mind, Boudon addressed the evaluation of the avail-
able theories in search for some theory that could be presented as a general 
theory of social behavior. It should be pointed out that the exercise consisting 
in evaluating theories comparatively is not only a legitimate exercise, but a 
desirable one. In a normal science, theories do not peacefully coexist, isolated 
from one another in their ivory towers. Weaker theories surely would interpret 
the comparative assessment as an aggressive attack on a supposed desirable 
diversity, but respect for weak theories is not what made science knowledge 
progress (quite the opposite).
In the case of Boudon, this comparative evaluation is also made with the 
purpose of identifying a general theory of behavior. Even though Boudon did 
not explicitly state what he meant by “general theory”, one can infer from 
his writings that he was referring to a theory that, given its strength, can be 
used “by default” in explanations. For example, if rational choice theory is 
 considered a general theory, then it would make sense to establish the meth-
odological principle of rationality: if a behavior is to be explained, the reason-
able thing to do is to start with rationality-based explanations (1998b: 174). 
Thus, using a type of explanation “by default” would not be a guarantee of 
success, since other causal forces could be operating, but it would be the least 
bad of all methodological strategies.
That being said, what is really questionable is the way Boudon makes 
this comparative assessment. In this paper, I shall try to defend the fol-
lowing arguments. First, I shall state that there are serious problems in the 
arguments that Boudon uses to dismiss the explanatory strategy based on 
what he called “biological causes” of behavior. Secondly, I shall point out 
that some recent findings of several behavioral sciences constitute a radical 
questioning of the value of his Theory of Ordinary Rationality (TOR from 
now on), and generally of the rationalist or utilitarian-cognitivist paradigm, 
as well as a positive revaluation of the Evolutionary Theory of social behavior 
or Evolutionary Psychology (EP from now on). And lastly, I shall maintain 
that, in the light of these findings and the current state of our knowledge, 
neither the reason-based explanatory strategy nor the biological causes-based 
explanatory strategy can be proposed as a “by default” strategy in the expla-
nation of social behavior, although EP is better placed to do the job. In this 
sense, the fundamental challenge of the microfoundation strategy of social 
phenomena will be its ability to generate useful knowledge and criteria to 
determine which of these two strategies or combination of both is appropri-
ate in each case.
1.1. Evaluating theories of social behavior
In his discussion on the sociology that really matters (2002), Boudon presented 
a set of criteria for judging what a scientific theory is and how to judge its 
strength. It seems clear that he used these criteria in his comparative evalua-
tion of different theories of behavior (2006, 2007, 2009). These criteria are 
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uncontroversial, but could be more accurately developed. This is why we shall 
present them together with our proposed extension.
First, Boudon proposed the criterion of logical consistency of the propo-
sitions that form a theory (2002: 373): a theory cannot house inconsistent 
propositions. The criterion is indisputable, but it would also be necessary 
to point out that logical consistency is not a purely internal problem of the 
theory, so that we could extend the list of Boudon’s criteria adding the fol-
lowing one: the propositions of a theory must not conflict with principles and 
findings that are already well established in other sciences.
Second, Boudon pointed out the criterion of the acceptability of explana-
tory propositions (2002: 373). There are several reasons for the acceptability 
of a proposition, but Boudon especially stressed two: propositions must have 
empirical support and must not include obscure concepts. At least for realists, 
it is sensible to consider that empirical support must also be on the basis of the 
principles and assumptions of the theory, at least if we agree that the purpose 
of the theory is to explain and not only to predict. Therefore, the empirical 
support for the principles and assumptions of the theory is a criterion that 
could also be added to the list of those proposed by Boudon.
Thirdly, during his comparative evaluation of theories of behavior, Boudon 
also used the criterion of the explanatory scope of the theory (2006, 2007): 
theories can compete in their ability to integrate dispersed empirical results, 
so we expect that a general theory of behavior would not leave some relevant 
phenomena unexplained. However, the explanatory scope of a theory is not 
only an external problem: the process of logical inference from the postulates 
of the theory must be shown to be fertile in its ability to generate new testable 
predictions. A fertile theory in this sense is a theory with greater explanatory 
scope, so that fertility could also be added to the criteria proposed by Boudon.
Therefore, our extended version of the criteria used by Boudon leads us 
to the following six criteria: a) internal logical consistency, b) external logical 
consistency (with other disciplines), c) acceptability of its propositions, d) 
acceptability of its assumptions, e) explanatory scope, and f) fertility. Through-
out the paper, we shall use these six criteria for judging Boudon’s comparative 
evaluation of different theories of behavior and for revaluating it in the light 
of the new findings of several behavioral sciences.
2. Reasons and causes in Boudon’s writings
2.1. The Theory of Ordinary Rationality
Boudon was, along with Jon Elster, one of the authors who most acutely 
addressed the limitations of Rational Choice Theory (RCT from now on). While 
it is true that replacing an explanation of behavior based on cultural forces (such 
as socialization) for one based on RCT causes an advance in knowledge (see, 
e.g., Boudon, 2006), several theoretical and empirical reasons led Boudon to 
argue that RCT could not aspire to be a general theory of social behavior (1998a, 
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2006). From a theoretical point of view, it seems clear that a) not all actions are 
instrumental, b) not all instrumental actions are guided by the criterion of utility 
maximization, and c) RCT does not have much to say about the beliefs, values 
and objectives on which the action is based. In this sense, RCT has a problem 
with the fourth of our evaluation criteria (acceptability of the assumptions). From 
an empirical point of view, RCT is incapable of explaining phenomena such 
as the paradox of voting or several behaviors that are usually observed in the 
experiments of behavioral economics. RCT, therefore, also has a problem with 
the fifth evaluation criterion (the explanatory scope).
Following the lead of Simon (1982), Boudon grounded his theory in the 
notion of subjective rationality. In objective rationality, the reasons guiding the 
subject are objectively valid, and therefore there is no mystery as to why the 
subject perceives them as good reasons. In subjective rationality, reasons are not 
objectively grounded, yet they are perceived as good (Boudon, 1989). Given 
the demanding conditions to assert that a reason is objectively grounded, it 
was not difficult to conclude that in most situations the reasons that move 
us are subjective, and that this is something that our theory of behavior must 
take into account. In that way, Boudon connects with the Weberian tradition, 
according to which beliefs and actions can be objectively unfounded and still 
be understandable (i.e., explainable as a result of reasons perceived as good). 
Thus, he took on the challenge of building a theory of behavior based on 
an extended notion of rationality, not on rationality in the strict sense, but 
rather on reasonableness. Throughout the years, he gave different names to 
that theory: Cognitivist Model of Rationality (1996), Rational Model in the 
Broad Sense (2000), Theory of Ordinary Rationality (2009).
TOR seeks to explain the adherence of individuals to “goals, values  and 
representations” (Boudon, 2009: 58). According to this theory, individuals 
adhere to a goal, value or representation when they perceive it as the conse-
quence of a set of reasons composed of acceptable and compatible elements, 
and provided that there is no other preferable alternative set of reasons. Bou-
don called this the cognitive equilibrium principle (2012). Thus, the system 
of reasons cause the acceptance (and the strength of the acceptance) of the 
individual to that goal, value or representation.
According to Boudon, TOR keeps one of the main advantages of RCT: 
its final character. When an action is explained as the result of goals, values  or 
representations that are based on good reasons we are also providing a black-
box-free explanation. Thus, TOR is presented as a theory that posits that 
positive or representational beliefs (of the type X is true) and normative beliefs 
(of the type X is good, fair, legitimate...) are rational, that is, they are grounded 
on good reasons (Boudon, 2009). Actions motivated by these beliefs are then 
rational too.
Especially in The art of self-persuasion (1990), but also in other studies (e.g., 
1989), and following the lead of Weber, the more empirical Durkheim and 
some argumentative line of Simmel, Boudon showed that false beliefs, both 
individual and collective, are also understandable, that is to say, they are the 
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result of a coherent set of reasons that the individual perceives as acceptable. 
Undoubtedly, one of the great contributions of Boudon was to note that when 
we face the existence of false beliefs as scientists, the dead easy recourse to an 
irrational-based explanation, such as when we “explain” behavior as a result of 
socialization, offers less satisfactory explanations than those offered by TOR 
(see, for example, 1989). In fact, Boudon presents this dead easy recourse as 
part of a “spontaneous sociology” opposed to a scientific sociology (1990: 18). 
As we shall see, it is questionable that the same argument can be applied to the 
biological causes-based explanatory strategies.
2.2. Social causes: a demolishing critique
When Boudon developed a typology of theories of behavior (2006), as well 
as when he developed a typology of theories of values  (2001), he classified 
evolutionary and cultural explanations in the same category. Although both 
explanations have seemingly little to do with each other, in fact the classifica-
tion makes sense, since both explanations maintain that mental states can have 
causes that are unnoticed by the individual, rather than pointing to reasons as 
TRO does. In the words of Boudon, both theories understand mental states 
as caused, not as grounded (2001: 32).
Boudon addressed his criticism of social causes in his assessment of cultural 
forces-based explanations. We define social causes as those social structures that 
supposedly shape the individual mental states (Lizón, 2010). Boudon’s critique 
of the explanatory power of these causes is demolishing (see, for example, 
1990, 2006). The idea that individual beliefs are mere reflections of collective 
beliefs, manifested in the individual through socialization, is a surprisingly 
popular pseudo-explanation, but its fragility and inconsistency is obvious if 
analyzed in minimal detail. For Boudon, cultural explanations, such as the 
explanation of LévyBruhl of magical beliefs as a result of a “primitive mental-
ity”, are based on cumbersome psychological hypotheses and on ad hoc built 
concepts leading to tautological explanations (the “primitives” confuse verbal 
associations with causal relationships because they have a primitive mentality, 
and that mentality consists of a tendency to confuse verbal associations with 
causal relationships).
Fascinated by the huge diversity of human cultural forms (and to a large 
extent overestimating it), twentieth-century social science felt compelled to 
explain certain practices. With the weakness of his conceptual apparatus, the 
alternative of appealing to the effects of socialization used to generate the false 
impression of having solved the puzzle. To the question “why do members 
of culture x do y?” one could answer “because they have been socialized to do 
y”. This apparently deep proposition says practically nothing. The expression 
“have been socialized to do y” is equivalent to the expression “have learned 
that in culture x people do y”, so that by replacing this proposition for the 
original, the initial proposal states that “members of culture x do y because 
they have learned that members of the culture x do y”. Obviously, the original 
Reasons and biological causes. Some reflections on Boudon’s Theory… Papers 2014, 99/4 601
question still stands, and rather now the question is twofold: on the one hand, 
we might wonder about the origin of this cultural practice, and on the other 
hand, we might wonder about the reasons for the individual’s adherence to it 
(since the mere transmission from one generation to another does not explain 
its acceptance by the receiving generation: one would need reasons to maintain 
a belief learned through socialization – Boudon, 2001: 5-6). The problem of 
circularity in socialization-based explanations points at a problem of the cul-
tural forces theory with the third of our evaluation criteria (acceptability of the 
propositions). This acceptability is further compromised by the constant pres-
ence of ill-defined, ambiguous and obscure concepts such as habitus, primitive 
mentality, etc. (Boudon, 2006).
But the problems do not end there. Boudon also notes that these explana-
tions have problems with the first criterion (internal logical consistency). For 
example, in the case of the prevalence of the rule of unanimity in the collec-
tive decisions of rural Vietnamese societies, the theory of cultural forces states 
that in traditional rural areas the individual is subject to the group, and only a 
unanimous decision can be regarded as legitimized by the group. However, it 
is not difficult to see that the rule of unanimity is precisely the rule that gives 
more power to the individual over the group, as unanimity is synonymous 
with veto power (2006: 153).
Furthermore, cultural theories are weak in generating empirically testable 
theoretical predictions (sixth criterion). In that sense, Boudon appeals to the 
uncertainty about the effects of socialization. On the one hand, we know that 
socialization is not always successful, but the theory does not provide elements 
to predict when it will not be (e.g., Boudon points to Weber’s analysis of the 
sudden conversion of the Roman civil servants and military officials to Mono-
theism – 2006: 181). On the other hand, it is known that socialization can 
have opposite effects: an alcoholic father can either become a role model for his 
child, driving him to alcoholism, or become a negative model to avoid, lead-
ing him to abstemious behavior. Thus, the theory loses its scientific character, 
since a posteriori it is always able to interpret any observable effect as consistent 
with the proposed cause (or in other words, the theory does not provide tools 
for its refutation).
This does not mean that there are not social causes: socialization obvi-
ously exists and has an influence on our beliefs and behavior. But, since 
cultural theory is affected by so many problems, Boudon rightly conclud-
ed that it could not aspire to become a general theory of social behavior 
(1998a, 2006).
3. Boudon’s disdain for the biological causes
In the context of theories of behavior, we define biological causes as those 
neurophysiological processes with a genetically conditioned structure and 
function, which are activated and modulated by different (material or social) 
environmental inputs, operate outside the consciousness of the individual, 
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and have a direct or indirect systematic influence on behavior. In fact, the 
distinction between reasons and biological causes is very problematic. Are not 
reasons neurophysiological processes? Reasons are a biological phenomenon. 
However, we will reserve the term reasons to refer to conscious mental rep-
resentations consisting of arguments for or against a proposition or a set of 
propositions. It is obvious that these mental representations are the emergent 
effect of neurophysiological processes, but this is relatively unimportant in the 
context of this paper. The concept of biological causes is reserved here to refer to 
nonconscious processes operating either on behavior or on mental representa-
tions that govern behavior.
Given that there are no doubts that biological causes do exist, the debate 
for social scientists has focused on their relative importance and on the role 
they must play in the theory of social behavior. Boudon, and analytical sociolo-
gists overall, have played a fundamental role in the erosion of the false belief 
that social facts are sui generis, stating that the microfoundation explanatory 
strategy should be the proper sociological explanatory strategy, which certainly 
involves questioning the boundaries of sociology and psychology. But, with 
some exceptions (Lizón, 2010), the first generation of analytical sociologists 
stated their preference for intentional explanations of social action, and there-
fore felt some vertigo when facing the final consequences of the openness to 
explanations based on biological causes.
As already mentioned, the Boudonian approach to rationality is based 
on Simon’s distinction between objective and subjective rationality (1982). 
In its definition of subjective rationality, Simon refers to an action that is 
appropriate to the achievement of given goals within the limits imposed by 
exogenous (environmental characteristics) and endogenous (characteristics of 
the organisms) conditions or constraints. Boudon does not seem to develop 
all the implications of this crucial point of Simon. In his concept of cognitive 
rationality, he accepts that there are exogenous constraints on what we consider 
good reasons: different social contexts can result in different sets of reasons 
being more easily evoked and accepted (2003: 16, 2009: 63). However, he 
hesitated at how endogenous constraints should enter the model. Faced with 
this challenge, Boudon moved between questioning the concepts employed 
in the theory of biological causes and questioning the role to be reserved to 
these causes.
First, Boudon noted that the theory of “biological forces” had problems 
with the third of the evaluation criteria (acceptability of the propositions). In 
particular, he pointed out that concepts such as those of bias or risk aversion 
are just descriptive and ad hoc concepts leading to circular explanations. Thus, 
for example, appealing to the availability heuristic to explain an overestimation 
of probabilities would provide a tautological explanation: an individual tends 
to overestimate the probability of an event when it is easily accessible (with 
known, experienced or easy to remember examples) because he has a tendency 
to overestimate the probability of an event when it is easily accessible. Now, 
even though this critique seems solid, it faces a major objection. Consider, 
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for example, the behavior of some animals (including humans) consisting of 
preparing the nest (or equivalent) during pregnancy. Biologists have explained 
this behavior as a consequence of a nesting instinct. If the nesting instinct is 
defined as a tendency to prepare the nest during pregnancy, does this mean 
that biologists are offering a circular explanation? Obviously not, provided that 
it is justifiable to state that the instinct conceivably exists. But this is precisely 
what evolutionary theory does: to argue that biases (for example) result from 
a predisposition resulting from an adaptive process. Boudon himself admitted 
that “It [the notion of bias] could cease to be a mere word if it could be shown 
that biological evolution, say, has produced a wiring of the brain explaining 
the bias” (2006:159). But here Boudon confuses the biological and cognitive 
levels. It is not strictly necessary to identify the neural basis of a cognitive trait 
to defend its adaptive nature. In fact, the ways to support the plausibility of 
the existence of a “natural” predisposition are diverse: the neurophysiological 
basis is one, but also its ontogenetically early appearance, its presence in other 
primates, its universality in the human species, its functionality for certain 
adaptive challenges, etc. To the extent that the empirical findings of cognitive 
psychology have been restated by EP as evidence of adaptive cognitive-behavio-
ral programs (in the next section we will see several examples of this), Boudon’s 
objection is neutralized and the explanatory potential of EP reinforced.
As we said before, Boudon also believes that the acceptability of the propo-
sitions of a theory depends on its empirical evidence problems. In that regard, 
he noted that, in general, evolutionary explanations suggest a phylogenetic 
conjecture that it is hard to prove (1996: 130). This is a classic critique of EP, 
but it is generally based on the ignorance of the real heuristic discovery process 
that this theory uses (see, for example, Machery, forthcoming; Schmitt and 
Pilcher, 2004).
Second, Boudon attacked the theory of “biological forces” referring to its 
alleged problems with the first criterion of evaluation (internal logical consist-
ency). Thus, for example, he pointed out an alleged contradiction between 
natural selection and the existence of cognitive biases that systematically lead 
us to forecast errors (1996: 130). Boudon commits a fundamental error here: 
either he considers that adaptive designs of the past necessarily have to be 
adaptive in the present, or that adaptive designs of a context cannot be acti-
vated with harmful effects in other contexts. Both possibilities are wrong. As 
Gigerenzer could see, cognitive biases identified from the work of Kahneman 
and Tversky are adaptations that take most of the world’s regularities. But the 
world in which our brain evolved into its current form was the Paleolithic, 
not that of our societies.
And thirdly, Boudon highlighted some problems with the explanatory scope 
of the theory of “biological forces”. For example, he noted that this theory can-
not explain why in some experiments the answers are so sensitive to changes in 
the problem formulation (1996: 130). In fact, a main assumption of EP and 
cognitive psychology is that adaptations are extremely sensitive to contextual 
cues and, consequently, different cues can trigger very different behavioral 
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programs (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). For EP, behavior is extremely 
context-dependent.
As mentioned, in spite of all these criticisms, Boudon also addressed the 
question of the role that should be reserved for biological factors in explaining 
social behavior. His position here is far from clear, but in general, he noted 
that those forces must play some role. Referring to neuroscience, for example, 
he stated that “it can effectively contribute to the explanation of phenomena 
of interest to social science” (2009: 112). Surprisingly, the statement was not 
accompanied by any effort to integrate these contributions into his TOR, 
probably because his idea of the contribution of these disciplines was wrong. 
In his text La racionalidad en las ciencias sociales (2009) he presented two exam-
ples: that of an individual whose optimism was the result of a calcification in 
his amygdala and that of the acceptance of unfair proposals in an ultimatum 
game as a result of the neutralization of the activity of the dorsolateral frontal 
cortex. What is implicit in the text is that neuroscience could explain exotic or 
strange behaviors that result from the peculiarities of a special brain or from 
the sectorial paralysis of its normal activity. Thus, Boudon is omitting the real 
contribution of neuroscience: revealing how everyday actions and decisions 
of people with normal brains are related to processes that are beyond our 
consciousness.
Boudon questioned that biological causes could be the basis of a general 
theory of behavior (1996, 2001, 2006, 2007). We shall discuss if he was right 
or wrong in the last section. The problem is that, based on the errors and the 
unfounded criticisms presented above, he also ruled out biological causes as a 
key element in the explanation of social behavior. Below, we shall address the 
implications of this positioning.
3.1. A black box inside the black box
Boudon repeatedly noted that explanations based on the reference to psy-
chological forces (such as those contained in the concepts of bias or frame) or 
biological forces (such as those characteristic of sociobiology) are problematic 
(1998a: 820; 2003: 3). The main reason was that their inclusion was sup-
posed to necessarily derail the final nature of explanations based on ordinary 
rationality (2009: 116-117). Incorporating notions as bias or module a black 
box appeared where initially there was a final explanation, since these concepts 
relate to elements that are not self-explanatory and whose origin is unknown. 
Moreover, in many cases such terms would refer to confusing concepts, and 
Boudon even stated that they were “mere conjectures” (2006: 151) or “mere 
words” (1998a: 820).
However, Boudon also recognized that various “forces” that are not reasons 
can affect our beliefs and actions. He did so, for example, when he recognized 
that a belief can be explained by unconscious mechanisms such as adaptive 
preferences, or forces as passions (for example, he noted that jealousy can 
cause the belief in infidelity despite the absence of good reasons to support this 
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belief ) (1990: 4). In La racionalidad en las ciencias sociales (2009), he stated 
that “reasons grounding a belief [...] can be biased under the action of various 
mechanisms. But adherence to a belief is always the effect of reasons” (2009: 
87). Boudon, therefore, was open to recognizing the existence of systematic 
(biological or not) biases in the reasons grounding our beliefs and actions. 
Moreover, he acknowledged that there is not a general criterion on the strength 
of a set of reasons, and all that can be said is that we accept a set when we can-
not imagine a better alternative set (2003: 16-17), but this also raises doubts 
about the ultimate causes of that strength.
The obvious problem for Boudon’s position is that, if there are systematic 
but not studied biases in the persuasion power of a reason, TOR would be 
assuming a black box in its explanation. How can we assert the existence 
of systematic biases (on the strength and direction of a reason) the expla-
nation of whose functioning we choose not to consider in our theory, and 
state at the same time that the main virtue of that theory is the absence of 
black boxes in its explanations? The inevitable conclusion is that progress in 
understanding biological causes is showing the existence of a black box inside 
the black box: Boudonian identification of the set of reasons grounding a 
representation can open the black box that cultural theories and behaviorism 
blithely assumed, but this is often insufficient to ensure the final character 
of the explanation. In short, this is not about explanation of behavior being 
necessarily based either on reasons or on biological causes, but about these 
two causal forces operating in some combination that 21st-century behavioral 
science will have to unravel.1 As we shall see in the next section, EP is offer-
ing an evolutionary explanation of our set of adapted cognitive mechanisms, 
thus letting us go one step further in the process of microfoundation of social 
phenomena.
4. The challenges of behavioral sciences
As we shall try to argue in this section, the paths of behavioral sciences in the 
21st century are inevitably leading us to question the value of TOR as a gen-
eral theory of behavior. The illusion that a general theory of behavior could 
do without the so-called “biological forces”, despite the recognition of their 
systematic influence on mental representations and behavior, seems to have 
its days numbered: the biochemical can no longer be left out of the analysis of 
the psychosocial. In considering the role of “biological forces”, some empirical 
findings from very different disciplines and research areas are revolutionizing 
our conceptions of how we perceive, reason, decide, make moral judgments, 
enjoy the aesthetic, etc. TOR is not only unable to reconcile these results with 
1. The distinction between proximate and ultimate causes is a useful analytical tool, but behav-
ioral science cannot settle for an appeal to a supposed difference between two alternative 
“levels of explanation”: an interpretive framework identifying the articulation of both causal 
forces is required.
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the theory, but contradicts them, and is therefore seeing the acceptability of 
its assumptions and propositions very threatened. Facing TOR, EP is not only 
providing an interpretive framework to give coherence to all these findings, 
but is often serving as a generating matrix thereof.
To illustrate this argument, we shall conduct a comparative evaluation of 
TOR and EP in three different sections. First, we shall address how our under-
standing of how we process information (how we perceive, think, etc.) has been 
revolutionized. Second, we shall present some examples of how our explanation 
of the decision process (especially in economic issues) has been modified. And 
finally, we shall focus on how our ideas about how we make moral judgments 
have been challenged. These three fields (information processing, decisions, 
moral judgments) will serve to illustrate the battle of the two theories. For 
reasons of space, we cannot address other examples, but this analysis could be 
extended much further. For example, to assess the ways in which we assess the 
sex appeal of potential mates and how we choose mates, how we shape our 
magical and religious beliefs, how we form social hierarchies, etc.
4.1. How we process information
During the 20th century, and under the influence of behaviorism, it was 
believed that the human being was a blank slate that, under the right stimulus 
program, could end up showing (within the obvious biological limits) any 
belief, preference, skill, or behavior. The human being would only bring with 
itself a general capacity for learning and abstract reasoning, and the rest would 
be a result of the inputs coming from the social environment.
Despite their differences, both cultural theories and rationality-based theo-
ries are part of the Standard Model of Social Sciences (as Tooby and Cosmides 
called it – 1992). Faithful to this assumption on the human mind, the adher-
ence to beliefs has been understood in TOR as a result of a general reasoning 
ability: subjects would arrive at different beliefs because they are grounded on 
different sets of information, but everybody employs the same general intel-
ligence, the same rules of abstract inference. That is how Boudon explains, for 
example, the “rationality” of the primitive’s magical beliefs (see, for example, 
1989: 180; 2009: 69), but also scientific beliefs, normative beliefs, and any 
other type of mental representation. One and the same system of information 
processing (a general intelligence) would be grounding our good reasons to 
lend (or not) money to a friend, to morally condemn someone else’s behavior, 
or to judge a potential partner as desirable.
TOR, and in general all the theories based on rationality, are seeing this 
assumption challenged as a result of the confluence of several disciplines on 
the same approach: that the human mind, far from being a blank slate, is 
equipped with a set of psychological modules containing representations and 
content-specialized processes activated as a result of specific inputs from the 
environment and prefiguring automatic and predesigned responses (Cosmides 
and Tooby, 1994; Pinker, 2003; Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). Our mental 
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architecture has a domain-specific organization. The alleged indifference to the 
different stimuli is simply not true: the human mind processes different types 
of information differently, and that process involves many different cognitive-
behavioral and partly instinctive, unintentional and nonconscious processes. 
This conclusion is reached, in fact, having to fight the ideological appeal and 
the apparent obviousness of the theory of the black slate, and accumulating 
evidence especially coming (but not only) from neuroscience and cognitive 
psychology. From a neurophysiological point of view, the evidence that our 
mind does not process all inputs with the same system comes largely from the 
study of the effects of neuronal injuries. Localized lesions affect specific func-
tions without overall harm to the general cognitive ability of the individual. For 
example, there are individuals who maintain their ability to distinguish any two 
material objects but are unable to distinguish two human faces, two animals 
of different species, or two fruits. From a cognitive point of view, it has been 
shown, for instance, that different animals have an instinctive fear of specific 
predators despite not having seen them in their entire life, or even despite the 
species having been isolated from them for thousands of years (see, for example, 
Barrett, 2005). Unfortunately for culturalists and creationists, the human being 
is not different: a line of research (see, for example, Rackison and Derringer, 
2008) has convincingly shown a predisposition to fear of snakes in humans and 
primates: snakes immediately catch our attention on visual complex arrays, it is 
easier to induce fear of snakes than induce fear to other objects, and it is more 
difficult to reverse that fear than the fear of other objects. And beyond this 
anecdotal and irrelevant predisposition from a sociological point of view, much 
more relevant evidence for social analysis is being accumulated: our economic 
choices, our moral judgments and our preferences in mate selection are shaped 
by specific modules containing inherited predispositions, but the list goes on 
almost indefinitely. To the dismay of advocates of socialization as a demiurge, 
a few minutes after birth babies follow stimuli similar to human faces more 
frequently than other stimuli, and show a difference between men and women, 
the former showing more interest in mechanical objects and the latter in human 
faces (Connellan et al., 2000); at two days of life they show a preference for their 
native language (Moon et al. 1993); at two months they make  real social smiles 
(even if they are blind); at three months they already “know” some basic laws 
of physics (Baillargeon, 1987; Spelke, 1990); at 9 months they develop without 
instruction the so-called joint attention (using gaze direction of others to set their 
own) and they start to conceive others as intentional agents; at 18 months (and 
independently from encouragement and rewards) they show altruistic behavior 
(Tomasello, 2009), etc. And adults, despite the important role of socialization, 
also show partly automatic preferences and behaviors when they have to assess 
the beauty of a landscape (Orians and Heerwagen, 1992) or the artistic value of 
a work (Dutton, 2009), when they face the challenges of parenthood (see, for 
example, Gettler et al., 2011, 2012) or the threat of free-riders (Cosmides and 
Tooby, 1992, 2005), etc. All these predispositions would be nothing without 
the environment, but the information that comes from it would be nothing 
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more than an infinite chaos of bits of information if it were not for the existence 
of innate structuring structures in the human mind: without theories-formation 
mechanisms there cannot be learning.
Can a serious theory of behavior be grounded in the tabula rasa assump-
tion when the idea of  the equipotential mind is strongly discredited outside 
the culturalist stronghold which dominates the social sciences? Probably not. 
Boudon did not ignore these advances in our knowledge of the mind. In fact, 
on several occasions he acknowledged the falsity of the theory that states the 
human indifference to various stimuli, thereby accepting the idea that socializa-
tion works with and on innate predispositions (1997: 8, 2001: 77). But he did 
not develop this argument to its final consequences. From any point of view, 
TOR is part of the Standard Model of the Social Sciences.
The accumulation of empirical evidence from so many disciplines in favor 
of the idea of the adapted mind has led to a reversal of the burden of proof: it 
corresponds to the theory of the blank slate to explain how a general-purpose 
mind could evolve and produce the effects observed in the empirical work of 
those disciplines. And it does not seem to be having any success in this work. 
The consequences are devastating for TOR. A theory of behavior to be used as 
the basis for the microfoundation of social phenomena cannot contain state-
ments that are inconsistent with those established in other sciences (as the 
external logical consistency criterion states) and cannot be grounded in question-
able assumptions about human nature (according to our fourth criteria, the 
acceptability of the assumptions). The idea of  not giving any role to biological 
processes in cognition conflicts with the uncontested evidence on the modular-
ity of our mental architecture. Thus, its assumptions are deemed unrealistic 
and its propositions on the formation of beliefs are deemed inconsistent with 
propositions that are well established in other sciences.
Faced with this challenge, EP seems to be a much more solvent theory. 
From the evolutionary point of view, cognitive modules are conceived as adap-
tations: if there are specific systems to process specific types of information and 
containing pre-coded forms of reaction, it is because of their functionality in 
our past. These systems allowed us to effectively resolve recurring problems 
affecting our survival and reproduction during the Paleolithic. If, for example, 
we have a facial recognition module, it is because facial recognition had an 
adaptive function (to identify our people, remember past interactions, etc.). 
Our psychological architecture (the integrated set of instincts and general pur-
pose mechanisms) comes from an evolutionary process. The mind is a product 
of the brain, and there is no special reason why the functional design of this 
organ has escaped the molding forces of natural selection. Conceiving modules 
as “designed” by natural selection to solve adaptive problems, EP avoids the 
problems that TOR had with the second and fourth evaluation criterion.
Moreover, EP has been very capable of empirically substantiating its propo-
sitions. Very contrary to the claims of some common critics, who point to a 
problem with the third of our criteria (acceptability of the propositions) because 
of the lack of empirical evidence, the proposition that a cognitive module is 
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an adaptation is usually not a mere just-so story: EP seeks confirmation of its 
hypothesis from a surprising variety of sources (see, for example, Schmitt and 
Pilcher, 2004).
The powerful theoretical framework of EP exceeds that of TOR also in 
the arena of other evaluation criteria. From the explanatory scope point of 
view, EP (especially because of its modular conception of the mind) appears 
capable of integrating empirical evidence that TOR could not accommodate 
in its approach, as we shall see in the following sections. For example, how 
could TOR explain the asymmetry – and the universality of the asymmetry – 
between women and men in their mate-choice preferences? EP has successfully 
done so (Buss et al., 1990). How could TOR explain that in certain social 
exchange situations evolutionary logic leads us to a logically incorrect but adap-
tive response? EP has successfully done so (Cosmides and Tooby, 1992, 2005). 
How could TOR explain why attractive men cooperate less in social exchange 
while attractiveness does not affect the probability of women cooperation? EP 
has successfully done so (Takahashi et al., 2006).
Also from the point of view of fertility, EP outperforms TOR. Conceiving 
cognitive modules as adaptations is proving to be a matrix for the genera-
tion of novel hypotheses about previously unknown psychological traits that 
end up becoming part of the explanation for some behaviors, something that 
TOR cannot claim to be able to do, since it is limited to explaining behavior 
a posteriori. If a psychological mechanism is conceived as an adaptation, that 
is to say, if we state that it has been shaped by natural selection to perform a 
specific function, then we can infer some attributes or components (usually 
referred to as “design features”) that the mechanism is logically expected to 
have. For example, from error management theory it could be inferred that 
women (compared to men) underestimate the levels of romantic commitment 
that can be inferred from declarations of love. This design feature has been 
called commitment skepticism bias, and its existence has been confirmed by 
Buss (2000). As noted by Machery (forthcoming), grounding on assumptions 
about the adaptive nature of a psychological trait, EP is able to infer hypotheses 
about the existence of psychological capacities, the nature of the process, its 
development and some situational cues it uses.
4.2. How we make decisions
Simon’s transition from objective rationality to subjective rationality was only 
the beginning of a long process that eventually led to the crisis of the theories 
that placed reasons as the only relevant causal force over our decisions. At first, 
the limited power of rationality was recognized, but advances in disciplines 
such as cognitive psychology and neuroscience took the argument further. 
It was not only about the existence of cognitive limits in the application of 
abstract reasoning to particular problems, but about the ubiquity of neuro-
physiological based cognitive-behavioral programs that, at least in part, precode 
ways of perceiving, evaluating and deciding.
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In this section we present three examples of how the contributions of the 
behavioral sciences are putting TOR in check. Boudon faced several examples 
of these investigations (especially those from cognitive psychology – see, for 
example, 1990) and showed in a relatively acceptable way that they were rein-
terpretable from TOR. But this is far from being a proof of anything. If, say, 
the theory A is producing a series of results (a1, a2, a3…an) that challenge the 
theory B, the exercise showing that a1 and a3 are reinterpretable from B faces 
the general problem of falsification: resistance to contrary evidence rather than 
favorable evidence strengthens the theory. If a2 is still serving for the falsifica-
tion of B, the exercise is futile. In addition, new empirical findings in favor of 
A’s interpretation of a1 and a3 are sufficient to get things back to place and for 
A to claim its superiority over B. As I shall try to argue in this section, this is 
exactly what is happening with TOR: new empirical findings of the behavioral 
sciences are providing evidence against TOR while EP seems to be in a better 
position to make sense of them.
Time inconsistency. One of the challenges to RCT that have arisen from 
these disciplines points to the socalled time inconsistency: imminent payments 
are more valued than future ones. If we get to pick a unit of a good in a month 
or two units in a month and one day, we will choose the two units waiting for 
a month and a day, but if we get to choose a unit today or two units tomor-
row, many of us would choose a unit today. How could TOR explain time 
inconsistency? Is it possible to imagine any set of reasons according to which 
it is different to expect one day today than expecting one day in a month? In 
the absence of a declared set of reasons, one possibility would be to reconstruct 
the rationale underlying the decision, presenting behavior as if it were the result 
of this reasoning, but this strategy would lead us to a mere just-so story. There-
fore, TOR faces in this case a problem with the fifth evaluation criterion (the 
explanatory scope), since it is unable to account for this phenomenon.
EP, however, offers a more satisfactory answer: our behavior is ecologi-
cally rational. What moves us is nothing but impatience, and impatience is an 
evolved mechanism that allows us to manage uncertainty. If there is a possibil-
ity that the payment will not be made, and we do not know the likelihood of 
that possibility, the passing of time can help us to assess it (Sozou, 1998), so 
that the adaptive response is to choose two units within a month and one day 
instead of one within a month, but if we have to choose between a unit today 
and two units tomorrow, we should ensure the profit since we do not know 
how likely it is that the payment will not be made. Whereas in our evolution-
ary past the chance that determines access to future resources was presumably 
high, developing an eager response to such decisions allowed us to profit from 
regular statistical patterns in the environment, thereby improving our fitness. 
Note that the decision is not grounded on reasons, but is caused by impatience, 
and here impatience is ecologically rational.
In the field of the explanation of time inconsistency, the superiority of EP 
does not only lie in its hypotheses generator matrix offering the explanation 
presented above, but also in the fact that a set of successfully tested predic-
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tions whose results TOR would be unable to interpret have been inferred 
from that matrix. A first set of inferences are in the field of genetics. If time 
inconsistency is an adaptation, it necessarily has some support in our DNA. 
And indeed, there are some variants of genes that correlate with the tendency 
to show time-inconsistent preferences (Carpenter et al., 2011). Furthermore, 
by comparing twins a recent study has shown that “delay discounting” has a 
hereditary component (Anokhin et al., 2011).
Secondly, it would also be evidence for the consideration of time-inconsist-
ency as an evolved cognitive-emotional program that there were a neurological 
system specifically involved in the phenomenon. Authors like Manuck et al. 
(2003) and Peters and Büchel (2011) have identified that system. Hariri et 
al. (2006), for example, have shown that the preference for instant but minor 
rather than larger and deferred rewards seems to be associated with the ventral 
striatum activity.
Third, in the study of the function of this neuronal system, the role of 
hormones is particularly relevant. Time-inconsistent preferences are activated 
as a result of environmental inputs, but these preferences should have a bio-
chemical support. Here, Kayser et al. (2012) found evidence that dopamine 
reduces impulsivity in intertemporal choices, showing that hormones play a 
role in the structure of our temporal preferences.
Finally, another classic source of evidence of the adaptive nature of a psy-
chological trait is primatology. One argument supporting the evolving nature 
of a trait (though in itself insufficient, like all others) is that it is not unique to 
humans but shared with our closest relatives. In this regard, it has been experi-
mentally shown that this bias is not unique to humans, although it acquires 
specific features in each species. Non-human primates are also affected by it 
(e.g., rhesus monkeys – Hwang et al., 2009).
Therefore, we have evidence that suggests that genes play a role in this type 
of preferences, that there is a neuronal system involved in the phenomenon, 
that hormones play a role in this system, and that the trait is already present in 
other primates. In light of these results, the thesis that time inconsistency can 
be explained without reference to “biological forces” is untenable. Thus, with 
regard to time inconsistency, EP outperforms TOR (1) in fertility, as it is able 
to make new predictions (in fact, Boudon never offered evidence of TOR’s 
fertility); (2) acceptability of the empirical propositions, as it is able to success-
fully test those predictions; (3) in explanatory scope, as it is able to integrate all 
these empirical results into a theoretical framework; and (4) to the extent that 
these results come from different disciplines, also in external logic consistency.
Loss aversion. A second example of empirical results that are better resolved 
by EP than TOR is loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984), that is, the 
preference for avoiding losses rather than obtaining profits. Boudon considered 
this concept as merely descriptive, and thus the explanations of behavior as 
resulting therefrom, as circular. Again, this critique of the value of cognitive 
and evolutionary psychology due to its problems with the third criterion of 
evaluation (acceptability of the propositions) does not take into account some 
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of the most recent literature on the subject. Contrary to Boudon’s assertions, 
the concept of loss aversion allows us to formulate very clear predictions about 
certain so far unknown biases, something that seriously questions that the 
concept has a merely descriptive character. For example, from the concept 
of loss aversion the existence of another phenomenon has been inferred: the 
so-called endowment effect (Kahneman et al., 1990). TOR does not have this 
fertility, and moreover it also has difficulties explaining these behaviors: how 
could ordinary rationality explain the gap between what we would be willing to 
pay for a product and what we would be willing to receive to sell it (Knetsch, 
1989)?
In general, although we shall not go into detail, loss aversion bias has 
been explained by EP as an adaptation that seeks to maximize the number of 
offspring (see, for example, Levy, 2010) and initially seeks to maximize the 
acquisition of food resources (McDermott et al., 2008). If loss aversion is an 
adapted mechanism, it should be possible to find evidence of its genetic sup-
port, its biochemical basis, its neural organization and its relative continuity 
with non-human primates. And there is evidence in all these directions. Firstly, 
the variations of some genes are correlated with loss aversion. For example, 
there is some evidence that the serotonin transporter gene-linked polymorphic 
region (5-HTTLPR) polymorphism significantly influences performance in a 
Loss Aversion Task (He et al., 2010). In fact, beyond loss aversion, it seems 
that, in general, risk tolerance in financial decisions correlates with certain 
variants of some genes (Dreber et al., 2009; Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009; Zhong 
et al., 2009). By studying monozygotic and dizygotic twins, the heritability of 
economic risk preferences has been estimated to be 0.63 (Zyphur et al., 2009). 
Second, and consistent with the identified genes, the role of serotonin as a 
hormone that can lead to a reduction of loss aversion has been noted (Litt et 
al., 2006; Murphy et al., 2009). In general, risk behaviors in financial decisions 
are associated with the 2D:4D ratio, the ratio between the length of the second 
and fourth fingers; a ratio that depends on exposure to prenatal testosterone 
(Garbarino et al., 2011). Other studies have also indicated that risk behaviors 
in economic investments seem to have a nonlinear u-shaped relationship with 
endogenous testosterone levels (Stanton et al., 2011). Third, there is a dif-
ference in loss aversion between people with and without damage to certain 
parts of the brain (specifically in the amygdala, the orbitofrontal cortex and 
the insula, parts of the emotional brain) (De Martino et al., 2010; Shiv et al., 
2005), suggesting that such areas perform some function in the phenomenon. 
And finally, it has been shown that some non-human primates show exactly 
the same loss aversion behavior (Brosnan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2006).
Along with all this evidence of the evolutionary nature of this cognitive 
mechanism, the consideration of loss aversion as an adapted mechanism also 
allows us to elaborate new hypotheses on the cognitive field itself. EP, for 
example, has stated the domain-specific character of this mechanism, therefore 
predicting its variation in different contexts. As shown by Li et al. (2012), loss 
aversion is accentuated both in men and women when facing challenges in the 
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domain of self-protection, while it is erased for men facing challenges in the 
domain of mate selection, as inferred from EP.
In short, in relation to loss aversion, EP outperforms TOR insofar as the 
former is able to (1) provide an explanation of the phenomenon, (2) infer 
original predictions, (3) successfully test them, and (4) integrate all these dif-
ferent disciplines resulting in a single interpretive framework.
Social trust. The field of experimental economics, especially in connection 
with neuroeconomics, is also offering results that challenge the value of TOR 
as a general theory of behavior. Interestingly, Boudon referred to some of them 
as evidence of the limited character of RCT, but he could not note how far his 
theory was also challenged. To argue this point, we focus on a single example: 
experiments on trust.
In a trust game (Berg et al., 1995), an agent A (investor) receives an amount 
Y of money from the experimenter and has to send an amount X of money 
(0≤X≤Y) to agent B (trustee). The investor keeps the amount that he does not 
send to the trustee. The experimenter multiplies X by a factor (for example, 
he triples it) so that the trustee has 3X. The trustee must then freely decide 
how much (Z) he wants to return to the investor (0≤Z≤3X). So, the investor 
must decide whether to look for his own interest setting X=0, or to trust the 
trustee setting X>0.
As in many other experimental designs, RCT prediction is usually not 
fulfilled, as investors often transfer a positive amount to trustees. Can TOR 
explain why investors usually transfer a positive sum? Let’s say a subject has 
decided to transfer 50% of his money to his opponent. Given the condi-
tions of the experimental design (anonymity of the parties, the absence of 
reputation effects and shadow of the future, etc.), the subject probably has 
no option but to ground his decision on (1) his belief in the general level of 
people’s trustworthiness, so he can treat his opponent under that criterion, 
and (2) his belief in the level of frustration he expects to experience if the 
trustee turns out to be untrustworthy. Both beliefs would be grounded on the 
past experience of the investor. The decision of how much to transfer would 
therefore be the result of a combination between trustworthiness expectations 
and betrayal aversion. For the subject, his decision to transfer 50% would be 
well grounded on beliefs for which he has good reasons (given the conditions 
of the experiment, there seems to be no other set of reasons that would justify 
the decision).
So far, TOR seems to be able to explain something that RCT cannot. 
However, experiments designed to test the role of oxytocin in these decisions 
can jeopardize TOR’s explanation. In those designs all participants inhaled 
a product whose nature was unknown to them: half of them (the control) 
inhaled an innocuous substance and the other half (the treatment) inhaled 
a dose of oxytocin. The results indicate that there is a significant difference 
between the transfers of the two groups, being higher in the treatment (Baum-
gartner et al., 2008; Fehr et al., 2005; Kéri and Kiss, 2011; Kosfeld et al., 2005; 
Van Ijzendoorn and Bakermans-Kranenburg, 2012).
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Now let’s say that the same subject2 who decided to transfer 50% of his 
money in the classic game (equivalent to the control condition in the oxytocin 
experiment) decides to transfer 70% to his opponent when subjected to the 
inhalation of the hormone. For the subject, his decision would, in both cases, 
be grounded on his belief in the general level of people’s trustworthiness and 
his expectation about the level of frustration he would experience in the event 
of being betrayed. However, under the influence of oxytocin, the same evalu-
ation leads to a different decision. Indeed, experiments show that the belief in 
other’s trustworthiness is not altered between control and treatment, so that 
the most plausible hypothesis is that oxytocin affects betrayal aversion. When 
individuals are told to interact with a randomly acting machine, they do not 
modify their behavior despite oxytocin, which also reinforces the hypothesis 
of betrayal aversion (Elster, 2007).
Obviously, it is important to point out that what these experiments are 
showing is not that people become more trusting under the influence of oxy-
tocin, but that oxytocin levels affect trust levels. It is not about 70% being a 
result of inhaling the hormone and 50% being the result of a decision process 
“free” of biochemical influences. This hormone is naturally produced in all 
of us,3 and therefore it is logical to assume that what the treatment is doing 
is to increase its presence. The logical conclusion of the experiment is that 
our betrayal aversion in situations that require interpersonal trust is always 
influenced by oxytocin. As with the 50% transfer, TOR would explain the 
70% transfer as the effect of good reasons: the individual believes that he will 
experience a low level of frustration in the event of being betrayed, which 
justifies a generous transfer. However, it seems clear that the explanation is 
inadequate if it simply refers to the belief system that the subject mentioned, 
since the good reasons grounding those beliefs are actually always biased by 
biochemical processes acting beyond the subject’s awareness. 
These experimental results turn the TOR explanation into a black-box 
explanation. If sets of reasons are not judged solely on their internal proper-
ties (consistency, acceptability, etc.) as stated by TOR, but are systematically 
affected by “forces” that we had not contemplated, the explanation of behavior 
as a result of a set of reason ceases to be a final explanation: a more fine-grain 
theory is needed.
Neuroscience and EP provide us the tools needed to open the black box 
inside the black box. The proposed mechanism is the following: oxytocin is a 
hormone that inhibits the amygdala, which is a center that is responsible for 
2. Obviously, a subject cannot be exposed to the control and the treatment. Therefore, experi-
ments analyze the difference in the average responses in the dependent variable between 
control and treatment groups. However, for the sake of clarity, we present the analysis of 
these results as if this problem of causal inference were not the case.
3. In reality, the degree of the oxytocin effect depends on its receptors, and the variability on 
those receptors depends on our genetic information. In the experimental deign, however, 
the random assignment of subjects to the control and the treatment group ensures an initial 
equivalence that allow us to test the average impact of a specific dose of the hormone.
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emotional reactions, including fear, so that the hormone inhibits social fear, 
that is, aversion to being betrayed or exploited: it simply makes us more indif-
ferent to the possibility that others do not honor our trusting behavior towards 
them. And what do the oxytocin levels which we are exposed to depend on? 
As could not be otherwise, they depend on the environment and genes. On 
one hand, experiences have an impact on the oxytocin level. Oxytocin levels 
lead us to a more trusting behavior, but at the same time, being a trustee also 
increases the levels of this hormone (Zak et al., 2005), leading us to behave as 
trustworthy. On the other hand, genes also play a role. An already identified 
gene encoding the protein OXTR, which is an oxytocin receptor, plays a cru-
cial role. Depending on the allele of this gene, our oxytocin levels are higher or 
lower. Research correlating the three possible alleles of the gene (GG, AG, AA) 
with different social behaviors are a reality that only the most dogmatic sociolo-
gists can ignore (see, for example, Rodrigues et al., 2009; SaphireBernstein et 
al., 2011; Tabak et al., 2013; Tost et al., 2010; Walum et al., 2012). One of 
them has already provided evidence that individuals with the GG allele show 
a more trusting behavior than the rest in a trust game (Krueger et al., 2012).
While TOR has nothing to say about these biochemical processes that bias 
our perceptions and beliefs, EP offers an interpretative framework capable of 
integrating all these empirical results. From this theory, trust is interpreted as 
an adaptation whose function would be to enable cooperation and reciprocity 
where it is not possible to check the honesty of the other (Dunbar et al., 2007: 
122), something that happens very often. Establishing relations of cooperation 
and reciprocity has obvious advantages for survival and reproduction, so the 
mechanism that makes this possible can be considered an adaptation. This 
evolutionary hypothesis allows us to interpret the role of genes and hormones 
in trust as biochemical processes resulting from natural selection in the envi-
ronment of our ancestors. In fact, although some authors argue that it is not 
necessary to identify the biochemical processes that underpin what is proposed 
as a cognitive adaptation, the fact is that mind-brain unity suggests otherwise, 
so that the inability to detect a “biochemistry of social trust” would have been 
a setback for EP (and its presence is non-definitive but important evidence in 
its favor).
Moreover, the hypothesis is enhanced to the extent that several inferences 
derived from it have been successfully tested. For example, if trust has a role 
to play when it is not possible to check the honesty of the other, it is logical 
to expect that evolution has endowed us with a special sensitivity to scrutinize 
honesty cues. Since relatives are often trustworthy, phenotypic resemblance 
may act as one of these cues. DeBruine (2005) designed a trust game in which 
the investor was shown a picture of the trustee. In the control group a picture 
of a stranger was shown, while investors in the treatment were shown a photo 
that mixed the face of a stranger and the investor himself. Members of the 
treatment group were more likely to trust the trustee, confirming the inference 
obtained from the evolutionary theory of kin selection. When the phenotypic 
resemblance is not relevant or is simply absent, we seek other facial cues. 
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Using different brain imaging techniques, research such as that by Engell et 
al. (2007), Todorov et al. (2008), and Winston et al. (2002) show that there 
are specific areas of the brain that are activated to assess trustworthiness, con-
tributing to the idea that trust is a hard-wired mechanism.
4.3. How we make moral judgments
A final example of the challenges that question the validity of TOR as a general 
theory of behavior comes from the science of the moral, and especially, from 
the confluence of research on moral philosophy and neuroscience.
Boudon postulated TOR as a theory that could also account for normative 
beliefs, and therefore moral convictions. For him, both positive and norma-
tive representations are always the result of a set of good reasons (2009). In 
The moral sense (1997) he explicitly addressed the question of the existence 
of innate and universal moral intuitions. In this text and in others, Boudon 
explicitly accepted the existence of an innate moral sense, but argued that its 
explanatory power of normative feelings was limited (1997: 9, 2001: 77). Bou-
don’s objections were basically two. First, the theory of an innate moral sense 
would have difficulties explaining cultural variation. Second, although Boudon 
recognized that our assessments may be influenced by our human nature, the 
former generally cannot be deducted from the latter (1997: 9). Therefore, the 
criticism focuses on the fifth of the evaluative criteria (the explanatory scope 
of the theory). In the lines that follow I shall present some approaches to the 
science of morality that not only provide solid counterarguments to these 
objections, but also pose serious problems for TOR (problems that EP have 
no difficulty in solving).
That evolution has a role in the moral is something that Darwin himself 
had warned of (1871). However, the research that has shaped the evolution-
ary perspective of our moral sense is relatively recent. In an influential paper, 
Steven Pinker summarized this perspective (2008). For Pinker, our biological 
equipment incorporates a “moral switcher” that, when activated, leads to a 
special kind of reasoning (if you can call it that); a reasoning other than the one 
employed to determine if we like something, we are interested in it, etc. The 
rules that guide this mind-set are comparable to those of Chomsky’s universal 
grammar: they are universal and they structure our moral intuitions in a way 
that goes unnoticed.
Brown’s list of human universals (1991) includes a considerable number 
of aspects that can be considered typical of the moral: prohibitions such as 
incest, rape or violence, feelings such as shame, promotion of generous behav-
ior and evil punishing, the distinction between good and evil, etc. Following 
this line, Haidt and colleagues noted that all cultures considered immoral 
things like hurting others, inequity, the lack of loyalty to the community, the 
lack of respect for authority and impurity (Haidt and Graham, 2007a; Haidt 
and Joseph, 2004). For them, these five principles are considered the ultimate 
psychological basis of all moral rules. Their universality is already evidence in 
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favor of its innate character, but so is that 1) all (except for purity) have some 
continuity in the behavior of other primates (de Waal, 1996), 2) an evolution-
ary history has been proposed for all of them (for a summary, see Haidt and 
Kesebir, 2010), and 3) some moral behavior and a distinction between moral 
rules and social conventions appear ontogenetically early (Tomasello, 2009; 
Turiel, 1983).
Boudon did not ignore this evidence, he simply pointed out (in his first 
objection) that the moral instinct could not account for the cultural diversity 
of moral conceptions. The error in this argument is clear: the moral instinct is 
universal, but apart from some behaviors that inevitably fall under the domain 
of morality (for example, rape or murder), others may moralize or amoralize 
depending on local, cultural processes (for example, in our societies tobacco 
consumption in public areas is no longer evaluated on pragmatic or instru-
mental criteria but it became moralized). Furthermore, the relative importance 
given to each of these principles varies between cultures and even between 
subcultures of a culture (Haidt and Graham, 2007b; Pinker, 2008). Boudon 
confused here the existence of a universal biological equipment to the defense 
of uniformity or universality of behavior; an argument that is clearly a non 
sequitur: at least part of our cultural conceptions are “evoked”, that is, resulting 
from different inputs operating over a universal mental architecture.
In fact, EP has no problem in explaining cultural diversity as a result of 
universal predispositions (for a distinction between evoked and transmitted 
culture, see Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). For example, Boudon (1998) recalls 
the case of Madame de Sévigné, who in the seventeenth century wrote his 
daughter telling her how much she enjoyed attending a public execution. 
Today no one would admit to enjoying a public execution, says Boudon, and 
a “naturalistic” theory could not explain this cultural shift in what we consider 
moral. However, it is clear that in the case of capital punishment different 
moral intuitions conflict with each other: on the one hand, not hurting, and 
on the other, punishing the evil and being loyal to your people. The relative 
importance given to each of these principles varies between cultures, so under-
standing variation in moral judgments is not impossible from a “naturalistic” 
theory. What the “naturalistic theory” sustains (among many other things, as 
we shall discuss below) is that a) neither then nor now a normal person might 
consider moral the execution of an innocent, precious and prestigious member 
of the community (cultural variation has limits), and b) the effort to study the 
ways in which local variations in inputs that operate on mental architecture 
produce universal cultural diversity is or can be part of this theory. 
The second objection that Boudon pointed out was that although our 
assessments may be influenced by our human nature, they cannot be deduced 
from it. The question, again, is whether these assessments can be understood 
without taking into account those influences. Our position is that they can-
not. As we argued above, the recognition of systematic influences on human 
representations that we choose not to analyze constitutes an explicit waiver to 
developing a final theory, that is, an acceptance of a black box. Being universal 
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moral instincts the psychological foundation of all belief or moral judgment, 
no theory of moral beliefs can seriously do without their consideration. Bou-
don tried to do so, but to unravel the reasons that support normative judg-
ments he was doomed to employ the fiction of the impartial spectator, who 
is able to put aside his interests and emotions and base his judgments only in 
the common sense (for example, 2009: 88). Boudon did not seem to wonder 
about the origins or ultimate foundation of that common sense, something 
that would have undoubtedly led him to research on the evolutionary basis of 
human morality. According to these investigations, Boudon’s impartial specta-
tor is equipped with innate predispositions to certain moral judgments. These 
predispositions also determine the type of moral reasoning that we do, and 
they do it in such a way that the principles of TOR are seriously threatened, 
as we discuss below.
Automaticity and rationalization. It is particularly important that the 
moral instincts often lead us to automatic, non-reflective moral judgments. 
These judgments are in many cases automatic and emotionally charged, and 
not the result of a conscious and deliberate evaluation. Haidt (2001), for exam-
ple, conducted an experiment in which subjects were presented the story of 
a brother and sister who decided to have sex (enjoying it without remorse, 
making sure that there would be no procreation and keeping it secret). It was 
a unanimous opinion that the behavior was morally wrong, but people had 
serious difficulties to argue it: either irrelevant reasons were given (such as the 
community would feel offended, something impossible as the story clarifies 
that the sexual encounter was kept secret), or the inability to express the rejec-
tion was expressed. This led Haidt to argue that rather than moral reasoning, 
people make a moral rationalization: unfortunately for TOR, the judgment 
precedes the reasons.
This interpretation leads to a particularly problematic issue for TOR as a 
whole, and not just for its explanation of normative beliefs: the pervasive nature 
of rationalization. Gazzaniga (2011) has provided a solid set of experimental 
evidence for the existence of a process of the left hemisphere of our brain that 
he calls “the interpreter”, which is responsible for developing coherent post hoc 
explanations of actions and emotions. Neuroscience has indicated that this 
interpreter “plays” with the perception of time and our own intentions. For 
example, we can perceive the sequence blow-pain-escape and then explain that 
the pain we felt led us away, but the truth is that the actual sequence was blow-
escape-pain. The interpreter “cannot stand” the idea of our action as caused 
by something other than desires and beliefs, and our beliefs as being caused by 
something other than reasons. In the field of moral judgments, the actual 
and the perceived sequence may not match, the moral emotion preceding the 
reasons for it, which actually are formulated a posteriori.
Unfortunately for TOR, neuroscience is providing strong evidence for this 
non-reflective, automatic character of moral judgments. Faced with different 
types of moral dilemmas, individuals experience a conflict between brain areas 
responsible for emotion (which would be triggered as a result of our moral 
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intuitions) and areas responsible for logical reasoning. In cases in which the 
involvement of the subject is colder or distant (like pushing a button involving 
the death of a person and the salvation of five), the latter take control. In cases 
where the involvement is more direct (like killing someone with your bare 
hands to save the lives of five others), the former take control (Greene et al., 
2001). This has been confirmed by Koenigs et al. (2007), who show the role 
of the emotional brain in moral judgments by studying patients with localized 
brain damage in those areas. Emotional drives, therefore, have a crucial role in 
much of our moral judgments (Nichols, 2004). In general, these judgments 
result from an interaction between emotion and cognition (Jeurissen et al., 
2014), but some triggers lead to the dominance of one or the other process 
(see, for example, Hristova et al., 2014).
What can TOR (a theory that aspires to be a general theory of behavior) say 
about these universal moral judgments, their automatic and not reflective char-
acter, their dependence on the emotional brain, the blocking of the rational 
brain and the subsequent rationalizations, the continuity of some moral traits 
with other primates, and their ontogenetically early appearance? I am afraid 
it cannot say anything.
An example: altruistic punishment. Some moral judgments mobilized in 
certain economic decisions also seem to be automatic, visceral. For exam-
ple, those taking place in the ultimatum game. This game is an experimental 
design in which two individuals interact anonymously. An individual A (the 
proposer) has to make a proposition on how to share a certain amount (say 
€ 100) with the individual B (the responder). If B accepts the proposal, the 
division becomes effective, but if B rejects, both will leave empty handed. The 
RCT prediction is clear: the proposer will offer to keep € 99 and transfer € 1, 
and the responder will accept the offer because it would be irrational to reject 
a positive amount. However, the experimental results show that most of the 
proposals are between 40% and 50% of the amount to be distributed, and 
propositions below 20% have a 0.4-0.6 probability of being rejected (Fehr and 
Schmidt, 2006: 622).
In several texts, Boudon stated that the generally fair proposals are evidence 
against RCT (see, for example, 1998b:180; 2006:156; 2009:49 and 90), and 
they certainly are. But Boudon neglects that the behavior of the respondent 
is equally relevant. Respondents facing unequal proposals usually reject them. 
Thus, the responder assumes a cost (he waves a positive amount) in what is 
obviously a punishment to the proposer for his inequity. This behavior has 
been called “altruistic punishment”. Although to our knowledge Boudon did 
not address the interpretation of this behavior, it seems clear that it would be 
interpreted from TOR as a behavior based on normative reasons such as “X is 
unfair”. Although the proposer is anonymous and the interaction is one-shot, 
Boudon could argue that the respondent punishes someone who violates a 
moral principle as equity because the subject observes a moral principle con-
sistent with punishing those who violate a moral principle such as equity, but 
the explanation here would become circular.
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In any case, the stab to TOR comes from the genetic and neurobiological 
studies showing that there is something more than normative reasons behind 
altruistic punishment. Boudon knew the experimental results suggesting that 
the dorsolateral frontal cortex plays a role in altruistic punishment (2009: 112), 
so if that area is neutralized in a subject receiving a very unequal proposal, the 
subject still judges the proposal as unfair but he accepts it (i.e., he does not 
punish the proposer) (Koenigs and Tranel, 2007; van’t Wout, 2005). Bou-
don’s conclusion is that RCT is only applicable in those cases when a part of 
the brain is neutralized. Surprisingly he did not notice that this result also has 
implications for TOR, since the normal functioning of the dorsolateral frontal 
cortex (an area of the prefrontal cortex) does not move the subject away from 
a decision based on instrumental reasons, but away from a decision based on 
reasons (in general). In that line, and using brain scanning techniques, Sanfey 
(2004) has shown that rejections are based on visceral disgust: unequal propos-
als make us feel bad. Against this emotional rejection, punishment feels like a 
good compensation to us: also by brain scanning, DeQuervain et al. (2004) 
have shown that people get pleasure from the punishment of norm violators. 
In other words, we punish because of the negative feelings we experience when 
we are victims of injustice and because by punishing we experience the pleas-
ure necessary to compensate for those feelings. In fact, subjects reject unequal 
proposals even when it leads to greater inequality, so that the goal of restoring 
equity could not explain the punishment (Moll and OliveiraSouza, 2007). 
As occurs in other situations of moral decision, guts act before reasons. The 
“moral reasoning” appears a posteriori to justify a behavior driven by forces 
that are not reasons.
Studies on the role of hormones also suggest that altruistic punishment 
is not driven exclusively by reasons. Research has shown that the probability 
of rejecting an unfair offer is greater in those with low levels of platelet sero-
tonin (Emanuele et al., 2008) and among men with high testosterone levels 
(Burnham, 2007). Regarding testosterone, it appears to involve a reduction 
in the activity of the orbitofrontal cortex (another area of the  prefrontal 
cortex), a brain region responsible for self-regulation and impulse control 
(Mehta and Beer, 2010), which comes to confirm the visceral, reactive char-
acter of this behavior. To the extent that genes play a role in encoding 
receptors of hormones that are relevant to behavior, genetic studies are also 
contributing significant evidence. For example, the dopamine D4 receptor 
(DRD4) gene appears to have a role in the rejection of offers in the ultima-
tum game (Zhong et al., 2010). In the field of genetics, but by means of 
twin studies, the heritability of these responses has been estimated at 42% 
(Wallace et al., 2007).
And again, what can TOR say about the automaticity of these behaviors, 
their relation to the functioning of certain brain areas, their connection with 
other hormones and genes responsible for those hormones’ receptors, and their 
relative heritability? Can a theory that aspires to offer final explanations and to 
be a general theory of behavior ignore all these influences? As a result of these 
Reasons and biological causes. Some reflections on Boudon’s Theory… Papers 2014, 99/4 621
findings, TOR is negatively affected in several of the criteria for evaluating 
theories: (1) in the acceptability of the propositions, since it establishes reasons 
as the only causes when empirical evidence points in another direction; (2) in 
external logical consistency and acceptability of the assumptions, since it assumes 
that a capacity for general reasoning applies equally in the formation of positive 
and normative beliefs when the evidence points to distinguishable cognitive 
processes; and (3) in explanatory scope, since it has nothing to say about the 
presented findings.
Faced with these problems of TOR, EP is proving to be a fertile matrix 
from where these evidences arise or to which they can be integrated. From 
an evolutionary point of view, the role of altruistic punishment appears to 
be twofold: first, it aims to increase the levels of cooperation (thus making 
available the adaptive advantages thereof), as the awareness of the existence of 
this type of behavior can deter defection (Fehr and Gatcher, 2002; Yamagi-
shi, 1986); and second, it reduces the initial adaptive advantage of free-riders 
(Price, Cosmides and Tooby, 2002). Once this feature has been selected for 
its adaptive functions, it would remain in us as an instinct, that is, a precoded 
action tendency (punishing the free-rider) triggered by a disgust/seeking 
pleasure emotion that has been programmed to be triggered by certain cues 
(e.g., intentions assessed as hostile or unfair), then taking control of our 
behavioral reaction. By posing altruistic punishment as a cognitive instinct, 
the findings of genetic and neurobiological studies are easily integrated into 
a single framework (when they are not directly inferred from it). Thus, EP 
is safe from the problems that TOR suffered with several of the theoretical 
evaluation criteria.
5. Which general theory of behavior?
As mentioned above, a general theory of behavior is one that, because of its 
strength, is entitled to be employed as a “by default” theory in the explana-
tion. The empirical findings of the behavioral sciences that we have discussed 
so far imply a negative reassessment of the strength of TOR, and especially a 
rejection of the necessarily final nature of its explanations. According to the 
idea of  “stopping rules” in the microfoundation of social phenomena, sociolo-
gists could stop at the level of reasons without accounting for the neurophysi-
ological processes that support them. In my opinion, this is right for many 
cases of sociological explanation. In these cases, good reasons appear to cause 
the behavior of individuals. However, the empirical evidence presented in 
this paper supports the view that in many other occasions, either reasons are 
systematically biased by biological causes, or these causes cause behavior, thus 
reasons are mere rationalizations. In either case, a reason-based explanation 
would be insufficient, and in some of them, wrong. TOR cannot claim the 
right to be used as a “by default” theory in the explanation of social behavior.
In the comparative evaluation we have made between TOR and EP, 
the latter is shown to be clearly superior. Can EP appeal to that strength 
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to stand as a general theory of behavior? In short: today probably it cannot, 
but it could do so in the future. The key will be its ability to accommodate 
the reason-based explanation in its framework. If EP is able to provide an 
interpretive framework that clarifies the conditions required for triggering 
a deliberative route and those required for triggering a more automatic, 
heuristic route, then choosing this framework “by default” in explaining 
social behavior would be the least bad alternative. The behavioral sciences 
of this century will have to work on building models that integrate reasons 
and biological causes. The evolutionary framework is a serious candidate to 
do the job.
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